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Abstract
Elliott Sober has suggested his criterion of contrastive testability as an improve-
ment over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability. I argue that his
criterion renders almost any theory empirically significant because its restrictions on
auxiliary assumptions are to weak. Even when the criterion is modified to avoid this
trivialization, it fails to meet other conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical
significance that follow from Sober’s position. I suggest to define empirical significance
as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does meet the con-
ditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of
empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability
as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy
that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, Elliott Sober (1990; 1999; 2007; 2008) has developed and de-
fended a criterion of empirical significance, called “testability”, that is both promising and
much needed. The promise stems from Sober’s defense of the criterion’s basic assumptions
and the fact that it can deal with probabilistic theories and auxiliary assumptions. The
need for a criterion of empirical significance stems from, for example, questions about
the empirical significance of string theory (Smolin 2006, Woit 2006) and the theory of
intelligent design (ID), to which Sober (1999; 2007; 2008) applies his criterion. Given
the possible applications of a criterion of empirical significance and the simultaneous
wide-spread belief that the search for such a criterion has utterly failed (Soames 2003,
ch. 13), it is somewhat surprising that Sober’s criterion has neither been subjected to much
scrutiny nor led to further research into criteria of empirical significance.1 This article is
meant to fill this gap.
I will only shortly discuss Sober’s application of testability, and argue that it cannot
be used to show that ID is not empirically significant (§2). More importantly, I will argue
that the criterion as it stands is trivial, but can be saved by changing the restrictions on the
auxiliary assumptions (§3).
Since Sober considers his definition of confirmation an explication (Sober 2008, 35)
and his definition of testability is an outgrowth thereof, it is plausible that the latter is
also meant as an explication.2 His definition is thus an explicatum for the explicandum
that could be circumscribed by pre-analytic terms like ‘having empirical content’, ‘making
observational assertions’, ‘predicting experimental outcomes’, or just ‘being an empirical
theory’ (cf. Kuipers 2007).3 One desideratum of an explication is that it must be possible
to use the explicatum in place of the explicandum in the relevant contexts (Carnap 1950,
§3; Hempel 1952, 663), which often leads to a variety of conditions of adequacy that an
explicatum has to fulfill. I will argue that Sober’s assumptions and the intended application
of his criterion of empirical significance lead to eight conditions of adequacy (§4.1), one of
them the condition that a probabilistic criterion of empirical significance should contain
falsifiability as a special case (§4.2).
1In fact, the only discussion of the criterion itself, rather than its application to ID, might be given by Justus
(2010) in a book review.
2Sober (2010, 1) states as much in an unpublished note.
3I will distinguish between use and mention and between concepts and their names only when this improves
clarity or readability.
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I then discuss the role of undefined probabilities to elucidate the conditions of adequacy
for probabilistic theories (§5) and show that Sober’s definition of testability meets only
four of the conditions of adequacy (§6). But this article is not purely critical. As a positive
contribution to the discussion, I suggest to define that a theory makes observational
assertions if and only if it is not empirically equivalent to a tautology, and to call a theory
empirically significant if and only if it makes observational assertions. This criterion
of empirical significance relies only on concepts that Sober accepts and fulfills all eight
conditions of adequacy (§7).
2 Three proposals for a criterion of empirical significance
Sober (2008, 154) conjectures that his criterion is “a step forward from the failed proposals
of the logical positivists”, but this is misleading because the logical positivists wanted to
distinguish between meaningful and meaningless sentences (cf. Carnap 1963, §6.A). Sober
(2010, 1), on the other hand, does not consider his definition of testability to provide a
criterion of empirical significance precisely because “‘[e]mpirical significance’ suggests that
a sequence of terms has meaning iff it is empirically testable” and he does not subscribe
to this position. Rather, Sober (2008, 149f) argues, meaningfulness is a semantic concept,
while testability is epistemic. And furthermore:
It seems clear that meaningfulness and testability are different. I suppose that
the sentence “undetectable angels exist” is untestable, but the sentence is not
meaningless gibberish. We know what it says, what logical relations it bears
to other statements, and we can discuss whether it is knowable; none of this
would be possible if the string of words literally made no sense.
Therefore Sober is rather improving on the demarcation criterion by Popper, who
wanted to distinguish empirical from non-empirical statements, both of which can be
meaningful (Popper 1935, §4; 1963, §II). I will follow Sober in the search for a demarcation
criterion for empirical statements, but not in his choice of terminology. I think that
‘empirical significance’ differs from ‘meaningfulness’ enough to avoid confusion, and, as a
technical term, is clearly meant as a placeholder for an explicatum. In any case, nothing in
the following will hinge on this terminology.
In line with his search for a demarcation criterion, Sober (2007; 2008, §2.8) introduces
his criterion as avoiding the problems of Popper’s falsifiability criterion, which demands
“that the theory allow us to deduce, roughly speaking, more empirical singular statements
than we can deduce from the initial conditions alone” (Popper 1935, 85). By application
of modus tollens, and assuming that the negation of an observation sentence is itself an
observation sentence, Popper (1935, 86) arrives at the following definition:
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A theory is to be called ‘empirical’ or ‘falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all
possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty
subclasses. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is incon-
sistent [ . . . ]; and secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does
not contradict [ . . . ].
Since Popper allows the use of auxiliary assumptions for the derivation of observation
sentences (cf. Lakatos 1974, 106f), possible basic statements (‘observation sentences’ in
the following) are those observation sentences compatible with the auxiliary assumptions.
This leads to
Definition 1. A theory H is falsifiable relative to auxiliary assumptions A if and only if there
is an observation sentence O with A 6 ¬O such that O ∧ A ¬H.4
Here and in the following I will assume that for all theories H and auxiliary assumptions A
it holds that Pr(H ∧ A)> 0, and thus specifically that H and A are compatible (H ∧ A 6⊥).
Therefore, H ∧ A must be compatible with some observation sentence, for otherwise it
would entail all observation sentences and their negations. Thus definition 1 captures
Popper’s formulation.
The problem with falsifiability, Sober (2008, 130, cf. 151) points out, is that no purely
probabilistic statement is falsifiable: “Consider a simple example: the statement that a
coin has a probability of .5 of landing heads each time it is tossed [ . . . ] is testable, but it
does not satisfy Popper’s criterion”. To avoid this result, Popper generalized his criterion,
considering a theory H falsified even if an event occurs that is possible but very improbable
according to H ∧A. But this generalization runs into problems as well, the most important
of which is, for the sequel, the following: If a theory implies an observation sentence, then
it allows a deductive inference via modus ponens, ‘{X , X → Y }  Y ’: The assumption of the
theory X and the fact that it implies Y entail Y . Popper justifies his criterion of falsifiability
by using the implication of an observation sentence in a modus tollens, ‘{¬Y, X → Y }  ¬X ’.
The justification of the probabilistic generalization of his criterion would thus have to rely
on a probabilistic version of modus tollens, in which a theory X is false or at the very least
improbable if Pr(Y |X ) is high and Y is false. But as Sober (2002, 69f) points out (cf. Sober
2008, §1.4):
There is a “smooth [t]ransition” between probabilistic and deductive modus
ponens; the minor premiss (“X ”) either ensures that Y is true, or makes Y very
4I will follow Sober in treating observational claims and theories as single sentences, and the auxiliary
assumptions as a finite set thereof. Finite sets of sentences are identified with the conjunctions of their
members. Mostly (and always for the auxiliary assumptions), the restriction to single sentences—in effect
a restriction to finite axiomatizations—is only a matter of notational convenience; I will note whenever it is
essential. To allow sets of sentences and higher order logic in the definition of falsifiability, it must be phrased
as “A theory H is falsifiable relative to assumptions A if and only if there is a set Ω of observation sentences
with Ω ∪ A 6⊥ such that Ω ∪H ∪ A⊥”, where A and H are sets of sentences and ⊥ is some contradiction.
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probable, depending on how the major premiss is formulated. In contrast,
there is a radical discontinuity between probabilistic and deductive modus
tollens. The minor premiss (“not-Y ”) guarantees that X is false in the one case,
but has no implications whatever about the probability of X in the other.
Therefore, while Popper is right to infer from the fact that a theory entails an observation
sentence that the theory is falsifiable, he cannot infer the same from the fact that it assigns
a high probability to an observation sentence (and thus a low probability to the sentence’s
negation). Thus the generalization of falsifiability to probabilistic theories has not been
justified.
A more successful criterion of empirical significance for probabilistic theories has been
suggested within Bayesianism, the position that non-deductive inferences should follow
the rules of the probability calculus, and specifically that the confirmation of scientific
theories should follow Bayes’s theorem,
Pr(H |O ∧ A) = Pr(O |H ∧ A) · Pr(H |A)
Pr(O |H ∧ A) · Pr(O |¬H ∧ A) . (1)
Pr(H |A) is the probability of the theory given only the auxiliary assumptions, that is,
before the observation O is taken into account, and thus called the prior probability (of
H). Pr(H |O ∧ A) is the probability of H after O is taken into account, and hence called
the posterior probability.5 Pr(O |H ∧ A) and Pr(O |¬H ∧ A) are the likelihoods of H and
¬H, respectively (for O). The standard criterion of empirical significance suggested within
Bayesianism is the following (cf. Sober 2008, 150):
Definition 2. Observations are relevant for theory H relative to auxiliary assumptions A if
and only if there is an observation sentence O such that
Pr(H |O ∧ A) 6= Pr(H |A) .6 (2)
Sober (2008, 150, 24–30) argues that if H is, say, the theory of general relativity, it is
well-nigh impossible to assign a probability to H, or assess the likelihood of ¬H, so that
Pr(H |A), Pr(O |¬H ∧ A), and Pr(H |O ∧ A) are often undefined. Bayes theorem (1) then
becomes unusable, and definition 2 very questionable.
Sober (2008, 152) suggests a criterion of empirical significance that avoids all of the
problems discussed so far. Unlike falsifiability, his criterion does not render all probabilistic
5Sober (2008, 8) calls Pr(H) the prior and Pr(H |O) the posterior probability and discusses Bayesianism
without auxiliary assumptions. But he also argues that Pr(O |H), which would be used to determine Pr(H |O),
is, unlike Pr(O |H ∧ A), almost never defined. Prior and posterior probabilities therefore have to be defined
relative to auxiliary assumptions, lest Bayesianism be empty.
6I will always silently assume that for any occurring conditional probability Pr(B |C), Pr(C) 6= 0.
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theories empirically non-significant and does not rely on a faulty probabilistic generaliza-
tion of modus tollens for its justification; unlike the Bayesian criterion, it does not rely on
the probabilities of whole theories or on likelihoods of the negations of theories:7
Hypothesis H1 can now be tested against hypothesis H2 if and only if there
exist true auxiliary assumptions A and an observation statement O such that
(i) Pr(O|H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O|H2 ∧ A), (ii) we now are justified in believing A, and
(iii) the justification we now have for believing A does not depend on believing
that H1 is true or that H2 is true and also does not depend on believing that O
is true (or that it is false).
Since ‘now’ is indexical, testability as defined is a predicate that changes over time.
Sober (2008, 151) remarks that the “word ‘now’ marks the fact that whether a proposition
has observational implications depends on the rest of what we are justified in believing,
and that can change”. This leads to a variety of inconveniences in connection with time
operators. For instance, “Yesterday Marie declared: ‘H1 is testable against H2’” can have a
truth value different from “Yesterday Marie declared H1 to be testable against H2”. The
first sentence is true if and only if Marie was talking about the justificatory status of the
auxiliary assumptions on the day of her utterance, the second sentence is true if and only
if Marie was talking about the justificatory status of the auxiliary assumptions on the
following day. It is therefore easier to think of contrastive testability as the three-place
predicate ‘H1 can at time t be tested against H2’. This still achieves Sober’s intention, and
arguably does so more explicitly.
The other indexical term, ‘we’, occurs only in the definiens, and thus makes Sober’s
criterion strictly speaking a claim rather than a definition. This is because the criterion
violates the demand that in an explicit definition, any free variable of the definiens must
also occur free in the definiendum, and thus Sober’s criterion is creative (cf. Belnap
1993, 139): If for two theories H1 and H2, one referent of ‘we’ fulfills the definiens, the
definiendum applies to H1 and H2. But then the definiendum applies to H1 and H2 no
matter the referent, and thus any referent of ‘we’ fulfills the definiens for H1 and H2. This
formal problem is easily solved by defining testability not only relative to time, but also
relative to a group of people and thus as a four-place predicate.
As it stands, restriction (iii) on the auxiliary assumptions sounds like the demand
that the justification of A must not depend on the fact that the truth of H1, H2, O or ¬O is
content of our belief. But very few statements are justified by the having of a belief, so
that condition (iii) would be almost empty if this was meant. The restriction is therefore
probably better expressed as the demand that the justifications for A must not depend
on the fact that the belief in the truth of H1, H2, O or ¬O is justified. For convenience, I
7Here and in the following quotations, I will replace Sober’s ‘&’ by ‘∧’.
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will drop the reference to beliefs completely in the following, and speak only of justified
sentences, rather than justified beliefs in the truth of propositions expressed by sentences.
Finally, the condition (i) on the likelihoods of H1 and H2 needs to be elucidated, given
that Sober’s critique of the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance assumes that some
likelihoods are undefined. Prima facie, one would expect that H1 and H2 cannot be tested
against each other if and only if Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) for all O and A that fulfill
conditions (ii) and (iii). But this would mean that the lack of testability is transitive for
any theories that are not used to justify each other’s auxiliary assumptions. And this is
incompatible with Sober’s remark that it is not clear that ID “can be tested against the
Epicurean hypothesis that a mindless chance process gave vertebrates their eyes (or, for
that matter, against the evolutionary hypothesis that the process of evolution by natural
selection did the work)” (Sober 2008, 148). Assuming that the chance hypothesis can be
tested against evolutionary theory (ET), if ID cannot be tested against either, the lack of
testability is not transitive. The solution to this puzzle is that Sober (2010, 2f) interprets
the inequality as true if and only if both likelihoods are defined and different. This
interpretation, however, plays havoc with classical logic, for p 6= q  ¬ p = q. Therefore, if
the likelihoods p and q are defined and different, while the likelihood a is undefined, it
follows from Sober’s interpretation of the inequality that p = a and a = q, while p 6= q. To
avoid such inconsistencies, it is probably best to treat undefined likelihoods separately in
the definition.
These considerations lead to
Definition 3 (Contrastive testability). Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 if and
only if there are auxiliary assumptions A and an observation sentence O such that
(I) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are defined,
(II) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A),
(III) A is justified, and
(IV) the justification of A
a) does not depend on H1 or H2 being justified and
b) does not depend on O or ¬O being justified.
One could reformulate definition 3 to include a reference to time and groups of people,
that is, define ‘H1 can be tested against H2 at time t by group g ’ by relativizing ‘justification’
(and possibly ‘dependence’) to time t and group g. In similar cases, especially when the
auxiliary assumptions are simply the background assumptions, these relativizations are
typically suppressed as it is clear that the background assumptions and generally the set of
justified sentences can change over time and from group to group. Thus I will do likewise.
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Sober calls his criterion simply ‘testability’, but the qualifier ‘contrastive’ distinguishes it
clearly from the ordinary language term and emphasizes that, atypically, the empirical sig-
nificance of one theory is defined relative to another. It may seem problematic to explicate
a one-place predicate like ‘makes observational assertions’ by a two-place predicate like
contrastive testability. Frege (1918, 291), for example, objects to the explication of ‘truth’
as a correspondence relation on the grounds that the first is a one-place, the second a
two-place predicate. However, many successful explications involve a change of the logical
structure, as the explication of ‘warm’ by ‘warmer than’ and finally ‘temperature’ illustrates
(Carnap 1950, §4). Hempel (1952, §10) even argues that the move from a classificatory to
a comparative concept is often a sign of an investigation’s maturity and, at another point,
argues that empirical significance is a matter of degree (Hempel 1965, 117):
Significant systems range from those whose entire extralogical vocabulary con-
sists of observation terms, through theories whose formulation relies heavily
on theoretical constructs, on to systems with hardly any bearing on potential
empirical findings.
It is plausible that such an explication of a classificatory by a comparative concept
is helpful (Popper 1935, §33; Lutz 2010a, §8.1). But unlike ‘warmer than’ and ‘more
significant than’, contrastive testability is symmetric: The definiens is invariant up to
logical equivalence under exchange of H1 and H2. This spells trouble for the intended use
of contrastive testability, the debate between proponents of ET and ID. Specifically, it means
that if “the hypothesis of intelligent design cannot be tested against evolutionary theory, at
least at present” (Sober 1999, 64), then ET also cannot be tested against ID. Thus the lack
of contrastive testability is, ceteris paribus, bad for ID if and only if it is bad for ET. The
ceteris paribus condition is necessary because there may be other criteria that break the
symmetry; contrastive testability itself, however, provides no reason to prefer ET over ID.
Specifically, if the lack of contrastive testability expresses that ID “doesn’t predict much of
anything” (Sober 2008, §2.14), then the same holds for ET.
In some passages Sober himself uses ‘testability’ like a one-place predicate. For instance,
his claims that ‘Undetectable angels exist’ is untestable and that ‘This coin has probability
of .5 of landing heads’ is testable are, strictly speaking, meaningless according to his own
definition. And both claims are important for Sober’s line of argument, since he relies on
the first to argue that testability is different from meaningfulness, and on the second to
argue that falsifiability is not an adequate criterion of empirical significance.
3 The restrictions on the auxiliary assumptions
Before looking further at the symmetry of definition 3, it is helpful to investigate some
of its other features. Justus (2010) already notes the imprecision of the terms ‘justified’,
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‘belief’, and ‘depend’, and the problems introduced by the time-index ‘now’. I will try to
stay clear of the pitfalls that come with these terms when discussing additional problems
with the restrictions (IVa) and (IVb) on the auxiliary assumptions.
Sober (1999, 54) introduces auxiliary assumptions into the definition because “hypothe-
ses rarely make observational predictions on their own; they require supplementation by
auxiliary assumptions if they are to be tested” (cf. Sober 2007, 5f; Sober 2008, 144).8 But
this “raises the question of which auxiliary assumptions we should use to render a theory
testable. What makes an auxiliary assumption ‘suitable’?” (Sober 2008, 144). He justifies
the restrictions (IVa) and (IVb) as follows (Sober 2008, 145; cf. Sober 2007, 6):
I hope it is obvious that if you want to use the observation O to test hypothesis
H1 against hypothesis H2, that the auxiliary assumptions you make must not
depend for their justification on assuming that H1 is true or on assuming that
H2 is true. What is perhaps less obvious is that the auxiliary assumptions
must be justified without assuming that O is true. Here is why that additional
constraint is needed: If O is true, so is the disjunction “either H1 is false or O is
true”. If you use this disjunction as your auxiliary assumption A1, then it turns
out that the conjunction H1∧A1 entails O. This allows H1 to make a prediction
about O even when H1 has nothing at all to do with O. The same ploy can be
used to obtain auxiliary assumptions A2 so that the conjunction H2 ∧ A2 also
entails O. Using propositions A1 and A2 as auxiliary assumptions leads to the
conclusion that the two hypotheses H1 and H2 both have likelihoods of unity.
As it stands, this argument proves nothing about the relevance of restriction (IVb) for
the definition of contrastive testability, since it only shows that for one specific auxiliary
assumption, A  A1 ∧ A2, both theories’ likelihoods are 1. But to show that H1 cannot
be tested against H2, their likelihoods have to be identical for all auxiliary assumptions
that fulfill restrictions (III) and (IVa). Furthermore, if the goal was to arrive at the same
likelihood for both theories, A O would achieve the same result.
But the ingenuity of the choice of A1 is exactly that, if H1 and H2 have nothing at
all to do with O, the likelihood of H1 ∧ A1 is 1, while the likelihood of H2 ∧ A1 is not.
Reconceptualized in this way, Sober’s case for restriction (IVb) is a typical trivialization
proof, since it shows that without it, any two theories can be tested against each other.
The argument has three implicit assumptions. Sober’s first assumption about justification
is that a sentence S (here: ¬H1 ∨O) logically entailed by a justified sentence J (here: O)
is also justified, since otherwise S might be excluded by restriction (III). Sober’s second
assumption about justification is that S depends for its justification only on J , for otherwise,
S might be excluded by restriction (IVa) or, implausibly, for its dependence on ¬O by
8Since Sober does not use ‘prediction’ to refer exclusively to claims about the future, I will treat it as
synonymous with ‘assertion’.
9
Sebastian Lutz On Sober’s Criterion of Contrastive Testability—Draft: 2010–12–13
restriction (IVb). The third assumption of the proof is that H1 is not a tautology, since
otherwise A1  O.
Sober does not show why the reference to ¬O in restriction (IVb) is necessary, but it
is clear that otherwise Sober’s trivialization proof could be repeated: Assume, as Sober
does,9 that the negation of an observation sentence is itself an observation sentence. Since
Pr(O |Hi ∧ A) = 1 − Pr(O |Hi ∧ A), i ∈ {1,2}, A can then be justified with O, while the
likelihoods of H1 and H2 would differ for ¬O.
Sober claims that restriction (IVa) is obvious, and that without it, the criterion would
beg the question (Sober 2007, 6). But this is at least not obvious. Arguments must not in
general allow their conclusion among their premises (that is, beg the question) because
otherwise every claim could be shown to be true, and the concept of an argument would
be trivial. But even without restriction (IVa), it is not possible to simply assume that H1
can be tested against H2 when the criterion is applied. In fact, I want to show that (IVa) is
often redundant, and in the remaining cases it is either ineffective or lacks a justification.
As for the redundancy, note that restriction (III) demands that A has to be justified,
and that a sentence whose justification depends on another sentence B is justified only
if B is justified. Giving up this relation between ‘justified’ and ‘depend’ would render
Sober’s restriction (IV) altogether empty. Thus an auxiliary assumption whose justification
depends on H1 can only be used in definition 3 if H1 itself is justified, and analogously for
H2. Typically, however, the question of empirical significance does not even come up for
theories that are already justified. Indeed, Sober assumes that a theory is confirmed only
if it is tested, and this is possible only if it is contrastively testable. Assuming that only
confirmed theories are justified, restriction (IVa) therefore goes beyond restriction (III)
only when the question of empirical significance has already been answered.10
Restriction (IVa) is ineffective at least in the following cases: Assume that for some O
and A, Pr(O |H1 ∧A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧A), and the justification of A depends on H2. Depending
on the exact explication of ‘justification’, it will often be the case that A depends for its
justification not on H2 in its full logical strength, but can rather also be justified by a
logically slightly weaker theory H ′2, which may, for example, result from H2 by a slight
decrease of the domain of applicability. Or, if A does depend on H2 in it full logical
strength, there may be slightly weaker auxiliary assumptions A′ that lead to the same
likelihoods but depend only on H ′2. Since it is implausible that H ′2 depends on H2 for its
justification (it is rather the other way around), H1 and H2 are contrastively testable in
spite of restriction (IVa).
In general it is not obvious why, if they are justified, H1, H2, or the sentences that
depend on them for justification should be excluded from the auxiliary assumptions. The
9See the discussion on page 20.
10Of course, one may want to justify or confirm an already justified or confirmed theory further, but this is
then not a question of contrastive testability any more.
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example that Sober (2008, 145) adduces to show the need for restriction (IVa) does not
make his case, as I will argue:
The point [ . . . ] is that, in testing H1 against H2, you must have a reason to
think that the auxiliary proposition A is true that is independent of whatever
you may already believe about H1 and H2. For example, suppose you are on
a jury. Jones is being tried for murder, but you are considering the possibility
that Smith may have done the deed instead. Evidence is brought to bear: A
size 12 shoe print was found in the mud outside the house where the murder
was committed, as was cigar ash, and shells from a Colt .45 revolver. Do
these pieces of evidence favor the hypothesis that Smith is the murderer or
the hypothesis that Jones is? It is a big mistake to answer these questions by
inventing assumptions. If you assume that Smith wears a size 12 shoe, smokes
cigars, and owns a Colt .45 and that Jones wears a size 10 shoe, does not
smoke, and does not own a gun, you can conclude that the evidence favors
Smith over Jones.
First note that in this example the question is which theory can be inferred from the
evidence, not which observations are asserted by the theory; that is, the example revolves
around a question of confirmation, not empirical significance. More important in the
following is that the belief about Smith’s shoe size would be excluded from the auxiliary
assumptions even without restriction (IVa). This is because, first, the belief that Smith
is the murderer (H1) is itself not justified, and thus cannot justify anything. Second,
Smith’s murdering someone does not allow to conclude anything about her shoe size.
The conclusion also requires the belief that there was a size 12 shoe print at the crime
scene (O). In other words, the justification of the auxiliary assumption depends on H1, so
that it is excluded from A by restriction (III), and depends on O, so that it is excluded by
restriction (IVb).
Restriction (IVa) is included in definition 3 for more serious reasons than fictitious
murder trials with careless jurors. It is meant to address an argument in defense of the
testability of ID that Sober (1999, 65, note and line break removed) describes as follows
(cf. Sober 2008, 143–146):
[A]dvocates of the design argument should not be confident that they know
what characteristics God would have wanted to give to organisms on earth if
he had created them. Creationists may be tempted to respond to this challenge
simply by inspecting the life we see around us and saying that God wanted
to create that. After all, if life is the result of God’s blueprint, can’t we infer
what the blueprint said by seeing what the resulting edifice looks like? [But
you] can’t just assume that God created organisms, and you also can’t assume
that if God created organisms he would have made them with such-and-such
characteristics.
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Analogous to the murder trial, the justification of the auxiliary assumption about God’s
characteristics in the creationists’ argument depends both on the assumption that God
exists and the observational assumption that life is as we see it around us, like “that”.11
Therefore it is excluded from A by restriction (III) because it is not justified until belief in
God is justified. And if a description of life as we see it around us is given as the observation
sentence O for which the likelihoods of ID and ET differ, then the auxiliary assumption is
also excluded by restriction (IVb) for dependence on O.
Let me now turn to Sober’s justification of restriction (IVb) and show that it is not
sufficient to avoid trivialization of definition 3. Specifically, any two theories can be tested
against each other as long as one of them can be finitely axiomatized and thus phrased as
one (possibly inordinately long) sentence:12
Claim 1. Let H1 and H2 be theories and O and S be any two sentences such that
1. O is an observation sentence,
2. S  O,
3. S is justified independently of O, ¬O, H1, or H2,
4. Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are defined, and
5. Pr(O |H2 ∧¬H1) 6= 1.
Under Sober’s assumptions about justification, H1 and H2 can then be tested against each
other.
Proof. Choose O and S such that conditions 1–5 hold. Then condition (I) of definition 3
is fulfilled. Since S is justified, so is A  ¬H1 ∨ S by Sober’s first assumption about
justification. It follows from Sober’s second assumption about justification that, since the
justification of S does not depend on O, ¬O, H1, or H2, neither does the justification of
A. Therefore A fulfills restrictions (III) and (IV) of definition 3. Since Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = 1
and from Pr
 
O |H2 ∧¬H1 6= 1 and S  O it follows that Pr O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨ S) 6= 1 (see
appendix, claim 10), it holds that Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A). H1 and H2 therefore
fulfill condition (II) of definition 3 and can be tested against each other.
Note that for Pr(H1 ∧ H2) = 0, condition (5) simplifies to ‘Pr(O |H2) 6= 1’ and that the
trivialization proof that Sober uses to justify restriction (IVb) can be recovered by dropping
the independence from O in condition (3) and choosing S = O.
11In disanalogy to the murder trial, the question in this case is indeed which observations the theory asserts,
not what can be inferred from the observations.
12Since the proof relies on the use of the negation of one of the theories, this restriction is essential.
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Conditions 1–3 are impossible to fulfill if a justification can proceed only deductively
from observation sentences, because then the justification of a sentence depends on every
observation sentence it entails. However, since Sober’s criterion is meant to be applicable
to inductive theories, it is plausible that auxiliary assumptions can also be inductively
justified. In that case, it is easy to find sentences S and O that fulfill all the requirements.
For instance, let S express that a specific vase does not break when dropped a hundred
times from a specific height, and O express that the vase does not break on the hundredth
drop. Then S is justified independently of O when the vase is dropped 99 times without
breaking, so that S and O fulfill conditions 1–5 for any two theories that are not about vases.
Since according to Sober (1999, 54), “hypotheses rarely make observational predictions
on their own”, that includes almost all theories. But even for two theories that make
assertions about vases, it should not be difficult to find other observations that neither
they nor their negations assert with probability 1, but that can be asserted by enumerative
induction.
To summarize, Sober’s restriction (IVa) is unjustified where it is not redundant or
ineffective, and restrictions (III) and (IV) together are to weak to avoid trivialization.
Clearly, the search for general restrictions on the auxiliary assumptions poses a host of
subtle problems. To bracket these problems, I suggest
Definition 4. Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 relative to auxiliary assumptions A
if and only if there exists an observation sentence O such that Pr(O |H1∧A) and Pr(O |H2∧A)
are defined and
Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) . (3)
This definition makes it necessary to decide on a case by case basis which auxiliary assump-
tions are suitable. This may be a good preliminary strategy, because often the suitable
auxiliary assumptions are, under the moniker ‘background assumptions’, reasonably clear.
Eventually, of course, it would be helpful to have a general criterion for suitable
auxiliary assumptions and define absolute contrastive testability as contrastive testability
relative to suitable auxiliary assumptions. To this end, I suggest the following. The proof of
claim 1 is a modification of a trivialization proof for Sober’s criterion of ‘having observable
implications’ (Lutz 2010a, §9.2) and leads to a similar diagnosis. Sober’s proof and that
of claim 1 rely on the possibility to include a sentence (¬H1 ∨O or ¬H1 ∨ S) in A that is
justified by another one (O or S) that is itself not included in A. Both trivialization proofs
can therefore be blocked by explicating ‘suitable auxiliary assumptions’ as ‘honest set of
auxiliary assumptions’:
Definition 5. A is an honest set if and only if every S ∈ A is a justified sentence, and A also
contains every sentence on which the justification of S depends.
Note that this definition only uses concepts that already occur in Sober’s definition 3 of
contrastive testability and that A can be a proper subset of the set of all justified sentences.
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Definition 5 allows to modify Sober’s criterion of testability as follows:
Definition 6. Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 if and only if H1 can be tested
against H2 relative to an honest set of auxiliary assumptions.
To distinguish clearly between concepts that are defined relative to auxiliary assumptions
(as in definition 4) and those that are not (as in definition 6), I will refer to the latter
sometimes as absolute concepts.
The restriction of the auxiliary assumptions in definition 6 to honest sets entails re-
striction (III) of definition 3. And while the restriction to honest sets does not entail
restriction (IVb), it precludes all trivializations precluded by that restriction: Two the-
ories H1 and H2 fail to be contrastively testable because of restriction (IVb) only if for
any S whose inclusion in A would lead to differing likelihoods for some O, the justifi-
cation of S depends on O or ¬O. In that case, (IVb) ensures that H1 and H2 are not
contrastively testable. The restriction of A to honest sets leads to the same result, because
if the justification of S depends on O (¬O) and A is honest, then O ∈ A (¬O ∈ A). Thus
P(O |H1 ∧ A) = 1 = P(O |H2 ∧ A) (P(O |H1 ∧ A) = 0 = P(O |H2 ∧ A)). As an example, take
the sentence ¬H1 ∨O of Sober’s trivialization proof. Restriction (IVb) excludes ¬H1 ∨O
from A, so that the likelihoods of H1 and H2 for O cannot differ because of ¬H1 ∨O. The
restriction to honest sets, on the other hand, leads to the inclusion of O in A, so that the
likelihoods do not differ, either. Unlike restriction (IVb), the restriction to honest sets
also leads to identical likelihoods if ¬H1 ∨ S ∈ A is justified by a sentence S  O, thereby
precluding the proof of claim 1.
Since it is not clear in which case restriction (IVa) is meant to preclude trivialization,
or in general, which problem it is meant to solve, I cannot show that definition 5 can
fulfill the role of restriction (IVa). Given the restriction’s questionable role and justification,
this should not be considered a drawback of definition 6. If there is a justification for
restriction (IVa), however, one can modify definition 6 by defining contrastive testability
as contrastive testability relative to an honest set that does not include H1 or H2. This
restriction entails restriction IVa.
While definition 6 avoids the above two trivialization proofs, it might allow others. In
response to such a proof, one can fall back on definition 4 until a better explication of
‘suitable’ is found than definition 5. In general, any results on which auxiliary assumptions
are suitable, or which assumptions are background assumptions, can be used directly as a
substitute for definition 5 (cf. Lutz 2010a, §9.2).
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4 Conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical signifi-
cance
Sober’s definition of contrastive testability, definition 3, is inadequate as a criterion of
empirical significance because it is trivial. Of course, there are other conditions of adequacy
that a criterion of empirical significance has to fulfill. I will argue that Sober’s assumptions
and his intended application of the criterion lead to eight such conditions.
Many of these conditions of adequacy relate empirical significance to concepts that rely
on assertion, that is, a kind of inference, and therefore have a deductive and a probabilistic
formulation. This is because deductive inference (entailment: B  C) clearly does not
generalize probabilistic inference (e. g., Pr(B) = q and Pr(C |B) = 1, thus Pr(C) = q). But
probabilistic inference also does not generalize deductive inference. For assume that the
domain has infinite cardinality. Then it may be that Pr(C |B) = 1, but there are cases in
which B is true and C is false. This happens, for example, when the domain is the interval
[0, 2] with a uniform probability distribution, B is ‘x ≤ 1’, and C is ‘x < 1’ (cf. Feller 1971,
33f).
This difference between the deductive and the probabilistic concept of inference gen-
erally leads to differences between the deductive and probabilistic formulations of the
conditions of adequacy, which in turn may lead to one criterion of deductive empirical
significance (in the following sometimes shortened to ‘deductive criterion’) and a sepa-
rate criterion of probabilistic empirical significance (‘probabilistic criterion’). A theory
may then be called empirically significant (simpliciter) if and only if it is deductively or
probabilistically empirically significant.
4.1 Conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance
(A) The criterion should not be trivial. A trivial definition, one that includes all or
no objects of the domain, cannot be a good explicatum for a concept that is meant to
include some, but not all objects of the domain. At the very least, a trivial explicatum is
uninformative. Since Sober intends to distinguish between theories that are worthy to be
pursued and theories that are not, his criterion must not be trivial, and he implicitly relies
on this condition of adequacy when arguing for restriction (IVb) of definition 3. Like the
proof of claim 1, his argument assumes that the theories under scrutiny are not tautologies.
A criterion of empirical significance that excludes or includes only tautologies is trivial only
in the domain of contingent theories, but this is arguably trivial enough for such a criterion
to be inadequate.
(B) The criterion should include all and only theories that make observational asser-
tions. Popper (1935) justifies his criterion of falsifiability with the assumption that all and
15
Sebastian Lutz On Sober’s Criterion of Contrastive Testability—Draft: 2010–12–13
only theories that make observational assertions are empirically significant. The assump-
tion is justified by Ayer (1936, 97), who argues that “the purpose” of an empirical theory
is “to enable us to anticipate the course of our sensations”. If Ayer’s argument is sound,
empirical significance is a necessary and sufficient condition for making observational
assertions.
Sober (2008, 130) states that “a testable statement makes predictions, either by de-
ductively entailing that an observation will occur or by conferring a probability on an
observational outcome.” Thus for Sober empirical significance is a sufficient condition for
the making of observational assertions. Let this be condition (i). Sober also subscribes
to the converse of condition (i) as can be seen from his claims that “[t]he problem with
the hypothesis of intelligent design is [ . . . ] that it doesn’t predict much of anything”
(Sober 2008, §2.15) and that his “criticism of the design argument might be summarized
by saying that the design hypothesis is untestable” (Sober 2008, 148). However, since
Sober (2008, §2.12) infers the lack of empirical significance from the lack of observational
assertions, his criticism of ID relies only on condition (i). Sober’s criticism of Popper’s
falsifiability criterion does seem to rest on the converse of condition (i): ‘This coin has
probability of .5 of landing heads each time it is tossed’ makes a probabilistic assertion,
and its lack of falsifiability is a reason for Sober to reject Popper’s criterion. This seems
to assume that every theory that makes probabilistic assertions is empirically significant.
Therefore, Sober’s arguments against ID and falsifiability rest on the condition that all and
only theories that make observational assertions are empirically significant.
Sober (2008, 52, n. 29) further states two relations between deductive empirical
significance and the making of deductive observational assertions:
If a true observation sentence entails H [ . . . ] you can conclude without further
ado that H is true; this is just modus ponens. And if H entails O and O turns out
to be false, you can conclude that H is false [ . . . ]; this is just modus tollens.
These are two sufficient conditions for empirical significance, (ii) entailment by an ob-
servation sentence and (iii) entailment of an observation sentence. Condition (iii) is the
converse of condition (i) when inferences are restricted to entailment (cf. Sober 1999,
72, n. 14). Thus, as argued above for inferences in general, a theory makes deductive
observational assertions if and only if it is deductively empirically significant.
Condition (ii), however, is arguably incompatible with condition (i): For any sentence
S and observation sentence O, O  O ∨ S, that is, according to condition (ii), O ∨ S is
empirically significant. But let S be such that it does not make observational assertions,
that is, for any observation sentence O′, S 6 O′, and S does not confer any probability on O′.
Then, as a matter of logic, O∨S 6 O′, so O∨S does not make deductive assertions. Arguably,
O∨S also does not confer a probability on any observation sentence. If, for example, O∨S
confers probability x on O′ if and only if O ∨ S  Pr(O′) = x , then the argument for
the deductive case can be repeated. If O and S are chosen so that they themselves are
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not assigned probabilities, then it is plausible that for any O′, Pr(O′ |O ∨ S) also cannot
be assigned a probability. Thus O ∨ S does not make any observational assertions and
is thus not empirically significant according to condition (i), which is incompatible with
condition (ii). On pain of inconsistency, Sober therefore has to choose whether all theories
entailed by observation sentences are empirically significant or whether all theories that
are empirically significant make observational assertions. Given that his core argument
against ID is that ID fails to make assertions, I take it that he would choose the latter.13
(C) The criterion should exclude all theories that are empirically equivalent to tau-
tologies. What it means for a theory to make probabilistic assertions may not be com-
pletely clear, especially since some probabilities may be undefined. It will therefore be
convenient to also have a plausible corollary of condition (B), starting from the observation
that a tautology >makes no deductive assertions, since B∧>  C only if B  C , and makes
no probabilistic assertions either, since Pr(C |B ∧>) = Pr(C |B) for all B and C . Therefore,
tautologies should be excluded by any criterion of empirically significance.
Flew (1950, 258) goes so far to call every theory that does not make observational
assertions a tautology, but this is clearly to strong: ‘Borogroves are mimsy’ is not a tautology,
but on account of containing two undefined terms, does not make any observational
assertions. Rather, any theory that makes the same observational assertions as a tautology
should be taken as not empirical significant. Unlike condition of adequacy (B), which
relies on some criterion for the making of observational assertions, condition (C) relies on
a criterion for empirical equivalence, the making of the same observational assertions. Out
of caution, one may treat the empirical non-equivalence to a tautology as a necessary, but
not as a sufficient condition for empirical significance.
(D) The criterion should allow some auxiliary assumptions. In logic and mathematics,
the power of using justified auxiliary assumptions is well known. A previously established
theorem can always be used in a proof, and by doing so, the proof is often enormously
shortened. In the sciences, justified auxiliary assumptions are often other theories or
boundary conditions for a specific experiment, and disallowing either would make scientific
research impossible. Sober (1999, 54) follows Duhem (1914) in stressing the latter point
when he states that “hypotheses rarely make observational predictions on their own” (cf.
Sober 2007, 5f; Sober 2008, 144). Therefore, theories that rely on suitable auxiliary
assumptions should not thereby be automatically empirically non-significant.
13Note that the claim “There is an intelligent designer” is equivalent to “There is a human designer or there
is a non-human designer” and thus analytically entailed by an observation sentence like “There are humans
who design”. Arguably, however, “There is a non-human designer” does not make an observational assertion,
so that “There is an intelligent designer” does not either. For further discussion, see Lutz (2010b, §4.1).
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(E) The criterion should not exclude all probabilistic theories. A probabilistic sen-
tence is, in a straightforward way, less certain than a non-probabilistic one. But that does
not mean that a probabilistic sentence is therefore of no use. In fact, decision theory has
been developed on the basis of probabilistic sentences about outcomes of actions, and its
practical uses are obvious. Thus a theory that makes probabilistic assertions should not
be rendered empirically non-significant. For Sober (1999, 57), this condition of adequacy
follows from condition (B) and the fact that probabilistic assertions are also assertions (cf.
Sober 2007, 5; Sober 2008, 130).
(F) The criterion should not rely on the probabilities of whole theories or likelihoods
of the negations of whole theories. Sober (2008, 24–30) argues that for many theories
H the probabilities Pr(H |A), Pr(H |O ∧ A), and Pr(O |¬H ∧ A) are undefined (cf. Sober
1990, §III). A criterion that relies on these probabilities would therefore be unusable in
many cases.
(G) The criterion should be equivalent to a Bayesian criterion of empirical signifi-
cance whenever all occurring probabilities are defined. Since Bayesianism relies on
probabilities of whole theories and likelihoods of negations of whole theories, Sober re-
jects it as a general method of scientific inference. Instead, Sober (2008, 37) suggests
likelihoodism, which relies only on the likelihoods of a theory, but notes (cf. Sober 2008,
32):
The likelihoodist is happy to assign probabilities to hypotheses when the assign-
ment of values to priors and likelihoods can be justified by appeal to empirical
information. Likelihoodism emerges as a statistical philosophy distinct from
Bayesianism only when this is not possible.
Since there are criteria of empirical significance that have been developed within Bayesian-
ism, this suggests that a probabilistic criterion of empirical significance should be equivalent
to one of these Bayesian criteria whenever all probabilities are defined. This Bayesian
criterion should, of course, fulfill all other criteria of adequacy.
(H) The probabilistic criterion should contain as a special case an adequate criterion
of deductive empirical significance that relies only on modus ponens. As already
mentioned, Sober sees a smooth transition between probabilistic and deductive modus
ponens (Sober 2002, 69f). More specifically, Sober (2008, 50) points out that the following
holds:
(Update) Prthen(H |O) is very high
O
O is all the evidence we have gathered between then and now.
Prnow(H) is very high
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This is nothing other than the rule of updating by strict conditionalization.
(Update) is a sensible rule, and it also has the property of being a generalization
of deductive modus ponens.
As argued at the beginning of this section, (Update) is not, strictly speaking, a gen-
eralization of modus ponens. But at least when all and only sentences with probability 1
are certain, deductive and probabilistic inference coincide. This can be put more precisely
as follows. Each structure M of a language L of predicate logic assigns a truth value
to each sentence in L . If PrM is defined as the function that assigns 1 to all sentences
true in M and 0 to all sentence false in M, then PrM is a probability assignment (see
appendix, claim 11). Call such probability assignments truth value-like. For truth value-like
probability assignments, probabilistic inferences and deductive inferences coincide: The
possible values of Pr(C |B) are restricted to 0 and 1, and Pr(C |B) = 1 if and only if B  C
(as always assuming that Pr(B) 6= 0; see appendix, claim 12). Truth value-like probabilities
may be assigned by fiat, but they also occur more or less naturally when the domain of the
theory is finite (so that there cannot be claims with probability 1 that are not certain) and
there are no regularities whatsoever, so that no probabilities can be assigned to statements
about the domain that are not known to be true.14
In this sense, then, there can be a smooth transition between probabilistic and de-
ductive inference. Given that all and only theories that make deductive or probabilistic
assertions must be empirically significant by condition of adequacy (B), there must then
also be a smooth transition between any criterion of probabilistic empirical significance
and a criterion of deductive empirical significance that uses the implications of the theory
only in a modus ponens. As I will say, the probabilistic criterion must contain as a special
case a deductive criterion that relies only on modus ponens. Of course, the deductive
criterion should fulfill all those conditions of adequacy that also have purely deductive
formulations, that is, conditions (A), (B), (C), and (D). To fulfill condition (B), it is enough
for the deductive criterion to include all and only theories that make deductive assertions,
because it is impossible that it could include theories that make only probabilistic asser-
tions. Analogously, it is enough if the criterion excludes all theories that are deductively
empirically equivalent to a tautology to meet condition (C).
Independently of any smooth transition in the case of assertions, the criterion of empir-
ical significance simpliciter should be a generalization of an adequate deductive criterion.
Thus, when the deductive and the probabilistic criterion coincide, the probabilistic crite-
rion must not include theories that the deductive criterion excludes. For if it did, these
theories would be included by the criterion of empirical significance simpliciter, and thus
this criterion would not generalize the deductive criterion, but rather contradict it.
∗ ∗ ∗
14The latter is arguably the case in Popper’s approach to induction (cf. Salmon 1967, §II.3).
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Some of these conditions of adequacy are controversial; especially condition (F) would
be challenged by Bayesians. But these conditions all follow from Sober’s basic assumptions
or apply to Sober’s criterion because of its intended application. Of course, it may be that
these conditions of adequacy are incompatible, so that some have to be given up. This
is the case for conditions (i) and (ii) discussed under condition of adequacy (B). But a
criterion of empirical significance that is to be applied as Sober intends should fulfill as
many of these conditions as possible.
4.2 Falsifiability is the unique adequate criterion of deductive empirical sig-
nificance
Condition of adequacy (H) demands that the deductive criterion contained in the proba-
bilistic criterion can be phrased in terms of modus ponens and fulfills all those conditions
of adequacy that pertain to deductive criteria. In this section, I want to show that these
conditions uniquely determine falsifiability. According to definition 1, a theory H is falsifi-
able relative to auxiliary assumptions A if and only if there is an observation sentence O
with A 6 ¬O such that O ∧ A ¬H. This can be combined with definition 5:
Definition 7. A theory H is falsifiable if and only if it is falsifiable relative to an honest set.
Sober (1999, 48–57) defends many of the assumptions on which falsifiability depends
against criticisms (see also Lutz 2010a, §2). As for the conditions of adequacy:
To show that a criterion is not trivial and thus fulfills condition (A), it is enough to give
a positive and a negative instance of the criterion. If O is an observation sentence, then O
is falsifiable relative to ∅, and if S is a sentence none of whose terms are observational,
then S is not falsifiable relative to ∅. Thus definition 1 is not trivial. If O is an observation
sentence, then O is also absolutely falsifiable according to definition 7, for it is falsifiable
relative to ∅, which is an honest set according to definition 5. Thus there is a falsifiable
sentence. I will not attempt to prove that there is a non-falsifiable sentence, because this
would amount to finding a sentence that is not falsifiable relative to any honest set. The
proof is immediate for tautologies, but impossible for contingent theories without more
precise notions of justification and dependence.
That falsifiability includes all theories that make deductive assertions is already pointed
out by Sober (1999, n. 14), who remarks that if “H ∧ A deductively entails O, and A is
known to be true, then, if we observe not-O, we can conclude that H is false.” Note that
Sober here assumes, like Popper, that the negation of an observation sentence is again
an observation sentence. Under this assumption, condition (B) uniquely determines the
criterion of relative falsifiability, if it is further assumed that a theory makes deductive
assertions if and only if it entails observation sentences not entailed by the auxiliary
assumptions alone:
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Definition 8. A theory H makes deductive observational assertions relative to assumptions
A if and only if there is an observation sentence O such that H ∧ A O and A 6 O.15
Definition 8 is equivalent to Sober’s definition of ‘having observational implications’ (Sober
2008, 151) except that the problem of suitable auxiliary assumptions is bracketed. Sober
uses restrictions (III) and (IV) to determine the auxiliary assumptions, which, as mentioned,
allows a trivialization proof.
Definition 8 leads to
Claim 2. If the negation of an observation sentence is again an observation sentence, then a
theory H is falsifiable relative to A if and only if it makes deductive observational assertions
relative to A.
Proof. If O, A, and H are sentences, the proof is immediate. If O, A, and H are sets, the
claim follows immediately from claim 13 (see appendix).
Note that the condition on observation sentences is not only implicitly assumed by
Sober, but also fulfilled by the most common restrictions on observation sentences: The
negation of an observation sentence is itself observational if all and only sentences with
a specific non-logical vocabulary are observational (cf. Psillos 2000, 158f), if all and
only molecular sentences with a specific vocabulary are observational (cf. Carnap 1937,
§23), and if all and only sentences are observational whose quantifiers are relativized to
observable objects (cf. Carnap 1956, §II; Friedman 1982, 276f). A sentence could also be
considered observational if and only if it is about observations, and according to Lewis
(1988, 140f), if a sentence is about observation, so is its negation. All these restrictions even
entail that the set of observation sentences is closed under truth-functional composition.
Therefore relative falsifiability arguably meets condition of adequacy (B).
Claim 2 establishes that absolute falsifiability meets condition (B) if and only if it is
the case that a theory makes deductive assertions iff it makes deductive assertions relative
to an honest set. But even if the definition of an honest set turns out to be wanting in
some respect, there is no obvious reason to doubt that the auxiliary assumptions suitable
for falsifiability are also suitable for assertions. Rather, since background assumptions
are usually considered to be independent from the concepts that rely on them, this is a
fairly plausible conjecture. Under this conjecture, all equivalence results between relative
concepts transfer to absolute concepts, and it will be silently assumed in the following.
15To allow sets of sentences and higher order logic, the definition must be phrased as “A theory H makes
deductive observational assertions relative to assumptions A if and only if there are a set Ω of observation
sentences and an observation sentence O such that Ω ∪ H ∪ A  O and Ω ∪ A 6 O”. If a logic is compact,
Ω ∪ H ∪ A  O if and only if there is a finite set Ω′ such that Ω′ ∪ H ∪ A  O, which is equivalent to
H ∪A ¬ ∧Ω′∧¬O. Hence this definition reduces to definition 8 in first order logic if the set of observation
sentences is closed under truth-functional composition.
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Independently of the question of auxiliary assumption, claim 2 establishes that both
falsifiability and relative falsifiability can be phrased so that they rely only on modus ponens.
Condition of adequacy (C) is fulfilled because no theories that are deductively empiri-
cally equivalent to a tautology > are falsifiable:
Definition 9. Two theories H1 and H2 are deductively empirically equivalent relative to
assumptions A if and only if for all observation sentence O, H1 ∧ A O iff H2 ∧ A O.16
Claim 3. If the negation of an observation sentence is again an observation sentence, H is
falsifiable relative to A if and only if H and > are not deductively empirically equivalent
relative to A.
Proof. H is not deductively empirically equivalent to> if and only if there is an observation
sentence O such that either H ∧ A O and A 6 O or H ∧ A 6 O and A O. Since the latter
disjunct is logically impossible, this is equivalent to H making deductive observational
assertions relative to A. Since the negation of an observation sentence is assumed to be
observational, this is equivalent to H being falsifiable relative to A by claim 2.17
Finally, falsifiability and relative falsifiability meet condition (D), for they explicitly
allow auxiliary assumptions.
Only falsifiability and equivalent criteria fulfill condition (B) in the deductive case, and
so it is good news that falsifiability can be phrased in terms of modus ponens and fulfills all
other conditions of adequacy that pertain to criteria of deductive empirical significance. To
meet condition of adequacy (H), any criterion of relative probabilistic empirical significance
must therefore contain relative falsifiability as formulated in definition 8 as a special case.
Then the corresponding absolute criterion also contains absolute falsifiability as a special
case.
5 Elucidations of the conditions of adequacy for probabilistic
criteria
The discussion of the adequacy of falsifiability is straightforward because concepts like the
making of deductive assertions and deductive empirical equivalence are well-understood.
On the other hand, in the discussion of Sober’s interpretation of the inequality in the
criterion of contrastive testability in §2 and the discussion of the condition of adequacy (B),
it has already become apparent that dealing with undefined probabilities is not an entirely
16To allow sets of sentences and higher order logic, the definition must be phrased as “Two theories H1 and
H2 are deductively empirically equivalent relative to assumptions A if and only if for every set Ω of observation
sentences and every observation sentence O, Ω ∪H1 ∪ A O if and only if Ω ∪H2 ∪ A O”.
17The proof for sets of sentences is analogous, except for an additional existential quantification over sets of
observation sentences.
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Values of likelihoods Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A)
Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
x y T . . .
x x F . . .
x U T T T F F F U U U
U U T F U T F U T F U
Table 1: The nine possible interpretations of the inequality in definition 6 depending on the values of the
probabilities, where x , y with x 6= y are acceptable values for likelihoods, ‘T ’ stands for ‘true’, ‘F ’ stands for
‘false’, and ‘U ’ stands for ‘undefined’.
straightforward matter. And even though definition 4 treats the case of undefined likeli-
hoods explicitly, it still involves some lacunae. Specifically, if one of the likelihoods is not
defined, it is not obvious how to treat the inequality (3), and not entirely obvious how to
treat the whole definition. This is because the definition is logically a conjunction with
the inequality as a conjunct, and if the inequality is not defined, it is unclear whether a
conjunction with one undefined conjunct is undefined as well.
It is uncontentious that Pr(S |H) is defined when H assigns a unique probability to S.
But as Sober himself states when arguing for the need for auxiliary assumptions, theories
alone often do not assert anything, and thus do not assign a probability to any observation
sentence. And even with auxiliary assumptions, no theory will make assertions about
everything.18 Rather, assuming H∧A restricts the probabilities that can be assigned to some
sentences S to a subset of the interval [0, 1], possibly to one specific value x ∈ [0, 1], while
the range of probabilities for some sentences will remain unrestricted. The conditional
probability Pr(S |H ∧ A) can then either always be read as the set of probabilities that S
can have under the assumption of H ∧ A, from [0,1] to proper subsets thereof down to
the singleton set {x}, x ∈ [0, 1]. Or Pr(S |H ∧ A) may be read as defined only when it is a
set of some specific kind considered acceptable (e. g., an interval or a singleton set), and
undefined in all other cases.
The second reading of conditional probabilities leads to different interpretations of
the inequality (3), depending on the treatment of formulas that contain undefined terms.
Sober seems to assume the validity of classical logic, so that ¬ϕ is false if and only if ϕ is
true and tautologies are always true. This excludes some of the possible interpretations
as given in table 1: Considering again the case where p and q are defined and different,
while a is undefined, it is clear that interpretations 4–6 (5 being Sober’s) are inconsistent
18For the technically inclined: For any even remotely plausible theory H, H ∧ A can be observationally
complete only for very restricted languages, where H is observationally complete if and only if for all
observations O, Pr(O |H ∧ A) = x , x ∈ [0,1]. It is thus always possible to expand the language by well-
interpreted observation terms so that H fails to be observationally complete.
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because they lead to p = a, a = q, and p 6= q. When a is undefined, interpretations 1, 3,
7, and 9 do not render a 6= a false, and thus they are also excluded. Interpretation 8 is
excluded if one demands that classical logic be truth-preserving and at least one disjunct
of a true disjunction be true. For then, if p and q are defined and identical, while a and
b are undefined, p = q and a = b are true, and entail a = p ∨ b 6= q, which according to
interpretation 8 has two undefined disjuncts. The remaining interpretation 2 can be seen
as following from the introduction of the special value ‘undefined’ for probability-terms.
Under these assumptions, there are thus two possible interpretations of the inequality:
1. When all sets of probabilities are acceptable, the inequality is true if and only if the
two sets differ. Otherwise, it is false.
2. When some sets of probabilities are unacceptable, the inequality is true if and only if
its two sides are defined and different, or one side is defined and the other one is
not. Otherwise, the inequality is false.
It is clear that the inequality is true more often for interpretation 1 than for interpretation 2,
since in interpretation 1 it is true whenever a set of probabilities on one side differs from
the set on the other side, but also when there is a difference between two sets that are
unacceptable under the second reading of the likelihoods. It is also clear that Sober does
not subscribe to interpretation 1, since in that case, there are no undefined likelihoods. In
fact, he developed his concept of contrastive testability under the assumption that only
singleton sets of probabilities are acceptable (Sober 2010, 3).
If all probability assignments are truth value-like, then the two interpretations of
the inequality are equivalent, independently of whether {0,1} is an acceptable set of
probabilities. For if {0, 1} is an acceptable set, the interpretations are trivially equivalent;
if {0,1} is not acceptable, the inequality is false if and only if both likelihoods have the
values {0}, {1}, or {0,1}/undefined. Otherwise, the inequality is true.
With these two readings of probability and the corresponding interpretations of the
inequality, definition 4 is now indeed defined in all cases because the inequality is always
either true or false. And it is also possible to explicate condition of adequacy (C) in line
with Sober’s position, for he states that “empirically equivalent theories have identical
likelihoods” for any observation sentence O (Sober 1990, 399), which, treating the case of
undefined likelihoods explicitly, leads directly to
Definition 10. Theories H1 and H2 are probabilistically empirically equivalent relative to
auxiliary assumptions A if and only if for all observation sentences O,
(I) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are not defined or
(II) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are defined and Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧ A).
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As defined, probabilistic empirical equivalence contains deductive empirical equiva-
lence as a special case:
Claim 4. Let H1 and H2 be deductive theories and let all probability assignments be truth
value-like. Then H1 and H2 are probabilistically empirically equivalent relative to A if and
only if H1 and H2 are deductively empirically equivalent relative to A.
Proof. Since interpretation 1 and interpretation 2 are equivalent, it suffices to prove the
claim for interpretation 1. H1 is probabilistically empirically equivalent to H2 relative to A
if and only if for all observation sentence O, H1 ∧A restricts the probability to the same set
of values as H2 ∧A. Since for any H, Pr(S |H ∧A) = 0 if and only if Pr(¬S |H ∧A) = 1, this
is the case if and only if for every sentence, H1 ∧ A restricts the probability to 1 iff H2 ∧ A
does. By claim 12 (see appendix), this holds if and only if H1 ∧ A and H2 ∧ A entail the
same observation sentences, that is, if H1 and H2 are deductively empirically equivalent
relative to A.
Another reason to consider definition 10 a good explication of probabilistic empirical
equivalence is that, if the probabilities of H1 and H2 given A are defined, it bears the
same relation to the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance given in definition 2 as
the criterion of deductive empirical equivalence bears to falsifiability: If two theories are
deductively empirically equivalent, then either both or neither are deductively empirically
significant (see appendix, claim 14). Analogously, the following holds:
Claim 5. If Pr(H1 |A) and Pr(H2 |A) are defined and H1 is probabilistically empirically
equivalent to H2 relative to auxiliary assumptions A, then, relative to A, observations are
relevant for H1 if and only if observations are relevant for H2.
Proof. If O is any observation sentence for which Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧ A), then
Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |A) if and only if Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) = Pr(O |A). Therefore Pr(H1 |A) =
Pr(H2 |O ∧ A) if and only if Pr(H2 |A) = Pr(H2 |O ∧ A) (see appendix, claim 15). Thus
observations are relevant for both H1 and H2 or for neither.
Condition of adequacy (B) does not need to be fully explicated to show that it is not
met by contrastive testability, and since it immediately provides a new criterion of empirical
significance, it will be discussed in depth in §7.
6 Contrastive testability and the conditions of adequacy
Given the problems with the application of contrastive testability mentioned in §2, it
should come as no surprise that contrastive testability fails to meet some of the conditions
of adequacy. But it is perhaps not obvious which of the conditions it fails to meet and why
it fails to meet them.
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Condition of adequacy (A) is that a criterion of empirical significance must not be
trivial, and claim 1 shows that definition 3 does not meet this condition. Definition 6
does, however: Choose A = ∅, two non-observational, non-equivalent sentences S and
S′, and, for some observation sentence O, H1  S ∧ Pr(O) = p and H2  S′ ∧ Pr(O) = q
for some probabilities p and q. Then H1 and H2 are never equivalent, and H1 can be
contrastively tested against H2 if and only if p 6= q, so that many contingent theories can
and many contingent theories cannot be tested against each other relative to A. Since ∅ is
an honest set, H1 and H2 can also be absolutely tested against each other. As in the case
of absolute falsifiability, it is impossible to prove that there are contingent theories that
cannot be tested against each other relative to any honest set without more precise notions
of justification and dependence.
Though non-trivial, contrastive testability fails to meet the two most important condi-
tions of adequacy, conditions (B) and (C). That some theories that do not make probabilistic
assertions and theories that are probabilistically empirically equivalent to tautologies are
contrastively testable can be inferred from an example that Sober (1999, n. 24) attributes,
in a different context, to Greg Mougin:19
Let H1 = God created the eye, E = Jones is pregnant, A = Jones is sexually
active, and H2 = Jones used birth control. It is possible to test H1 against H2;
given independently attested background assumptions A, E favors H1 over H2.
In the example, the observation sentence E is assigned one probability by the background
assumptions alone (since H1 is not about Jones at all), and another by the conjunction of
the background assumptions and H2. Now choose H1  >. Then H1 does not make any
assertions and hence no observable ones, and H1 has trivially as much empirical content
as a tautology, but it can still be contrastively tested against H2, both relative to A and
absolutely, since the justification of A does not depend on E.
Condition (D) is fulfilled by design because contrastive testability allows for auxiliary
assumptions, and condition (E) is fulfilled because the theory H2 about Jones’s use of birth
control is probabilistic and can be tested against H1. Also by design, contrastive testability
does not rely on prior probabilities or the likelihoods of the negation of theories and thus
meets condition of adequacy (F).
Contrastive testability fails to meet condition (G) simply because so far, no Bayesian
criterion of empirical significance has been suggested that is equivalent to contrastive
testability when all occurring probabilities are defined. In this case, as can be seen
from its logical structure, relative contrastive testability is not equivalent to the typical
Bayesian criterion of empirical significance given by definition 2. Instead, it is almost the
contradictory of probabilistic empirical equivalence:
19Unlike in the example by Salmon (1971, 29–88), it is this time not John Jones who is using birth control,
but his wife.
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Claim 6. H1 cannot be tested against H2 relative to auxiliary assumptions A if and only if for
all observation sentences O,
(I) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) or Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) is not defined, or
(II) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧ A).
Thus contrastive testability differs from definition 10 in that it demands different relations
between defined and undefined likelihoods.
In principle, a probabilistic two-place predicate may contain a deductive one-place
predicate as a special case and thus meet condition (H). For example, if the probability
assignments are truth value-like, ‘Pr(O |H1) = .5∨ Pr(O |H2) = 1’ is equivalent to ‘H2  O’
because the first argument, H1, becomes irrelevant. But since contrastive testability is
symmetric, either both or neither of its two arguments are irrelevant for truth value-like
assignments and thus it cannot meet condition (H).
H1 can be tested against H2 if and only if their defined likelihoods differ for at least
one observation sentence. If only singleton sets of probabilities are acceptable (as Sober
assumes for his criterion), this means that at least with respect to one observation, one of
the two theories must be wrong. Arguably, then, contrastive testability explicates what it
means for two theories to be probabilistically empirically incompatible for the special case
that only singleton sets of likelihoods are acceptable. This is borne out by the comparison
with
Definition 11. Theories H1 and H2 are deductively empirically incompatible relative to
auxiliary assumptions A if and only if there there is an observation sentence O such that
H1 ∧ A O and H2 ∧ A ¬O.
Claim 7. Let H1 and H2 be deductive theories, let all probability assignments be truth value-
like, and let the set {0,1} be unacceptable as a value of a likelihood. Then H1 can be tested
against H2 relative to A if and only if H1 and H2 are deductively empirically incompatible
relative to A.
Proof. H1 can be tested against H2 if and only if there is an observation O such that the
likelihood of one theory for O is 0, while the other one is 1. Without loss of generality,
assume Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = 1 and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) = 0, that is, Pr(¬O |H2 ∧ A) = 1. By claim 12
(see appendix), this holds if and only if H1 ∧ A O and H2 ∧ A ¬O.
Thus, if only singleton sets are acceptable as values of likelihoods, then contrastive
testability contains as a special case a criterion for deductive theories that relies only on
modus ponens. It is only the wrong one.
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7 Explicating probabilistic empirical significance
Contrastive testability does not meet all criteria of adequacy, but that might just be because
the criteria cannot all be met at once. I will argue that this is not so by suggesting a
criterion of empirical significance that does meet all the conditions. First, however, I want
to discuss an intuitively attractive but flawed criterion.
One may think of defining that a theory is not empirically significant if and only if it
cannot be tested against any theory. That is, H1 is not empirically significant if and only
if for all suitable auxiliary assumptions A and all theories H2, claim 6 is true. But this
definition is inordinately inclusive. For assume that H1 is not such that all assertions from
suitable auxiliary assumptions become undefined, that is, Pr(O |A) and Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) are
defined (though possibly identical) for some O and some suitable A. Then H1 is empirically
significant if there is any H2 such that Pr(O |H2 ∧A) is defined and different from Pr(O |A).
For if Pr(O |A) = Pr(O |H1∧A), H1 can be tested against H2, and if Pr(O |A) 6= Pr(O |H1∧A),
H1 can be tested against any tautology. The premises of this argument are commonly true,
for example, according to Sober, if H1 is “God created the eye”, O is “Jones is pregnant”,
and A is “Jones is sexually active”, for then H2 can be “Jones used birth control”. Choosing
H1  >, the argument shows that tautologies are empirically significant, which runs afoul
of conditions of adequacy (B) and (C). It is also straightforward to show that conditions
(G) and (H) are not met.
A more promising path to a criterion of probabilistic significance leads through the
criterion of probabilistic empirically equivalence, definition 10. It follows from claims 2 and
3 that a theory makes deductive observational assertions if and only if it is not deductively
empirically equivalent to a tautology. This suggests conditions of adequacy (B) and (C) are
in fact equivalent, so that a theory makes probabilistic observational assertions relative to
auxiliary assumptions A if and only if it is not probabilistically empirically equivalent to
a tautology relative to A according to definition 4. Because Pr(O |> ∧ A) = Pr(O |A), this
leads to
Definition 12. Theory H makes probabilistic observational assertions relative to A if and
only if there exists an observation sentence O such that
(I) Pr(O |H ∧ A) is defined if and only if Pr(O |A) is not defined or
(II) Pr(O |H ∧ A) and Pr(O |A) are defined and Pr(O |H ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |A).
With the help of definition 5 of an honest set, one can give
Definition 13. Theory H makes probabilistic observational assertions if and only if H makes
probabilistic observational assertions relative to an honest set A.
It may be considered problematic that a theory H makes assertions if assuming H
makes it impossible to assign a probability to an observation that otherwise would be
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assigned a probability by the auxiliary assumptions alone. To render such theories empir-
ically non-significant, the biconditional in condition (I) of definition 12 could be made
into a conjunction. But it is plausible that a theory that asserts that some observable
regularity breaks down does make assertions. It certainly is pragmatically relevant when
some observation sentence can, contrary to the auxiliary assumptions, not be assigned a
probability.
Definitions 12 and 13 rely only on concepts that Sober uses himself, and should
therefore be conceptually unproblematic for him. He does not discuss the domains of
applicability of the concepts, but with one exception, the domains can just be assumed to
be the same for definitions 12 and 13 as they are for contrastive testability. The exception
is the term Pr(O |A). Sober could argue that the concept of a likelihood cannot be applied
to tautologies because the auxiliary assumptions themselves assign probabilities to no
or too few observation sentences. Sober (2008, 29f) in fact shortly discusses Pr(O), but
not in connection with auxiliary assumptions. The discussion therefore does clearly not
apply to definition 12, and it does not apply to definition 13 because H is testable if
there are some, not necessarily tautological, suitable auxiliary assumptions A such that
Pr(O |H∧A) differs from Pr(O |A). Sober’s original definition 3 and definition 5 of an honest
set put no restrictions on individual elements of A except that they be justified (in Sober’s
definition, independently of a specific observation sentence). Therefore whole theories can
be included in the background assumptions. Since Sober introduces auxiliary assumptions
to allow for actual scientific practice, and assertions made by scientific theories in fact often
use other scientific theories as auxiliary assumptions, such an inclusion obeys letter and
spirit of Sober’s criterion. Since scientific theories H are supposed to make observational
assertions, Pr(O |H ∧ A) will often be defined. And the inclusion of H into the auxiliary
assumptions is then just the notational change to Pr(O |A′) with A′  H ∧ A .
It now follows from condition of adequacy (B) that all and only theories that fulfill def-
initions 12 or 13 are probabilistically empirically significant. Without any basic conceptual
problems, a theory can then be defined to be empirically significant (relative to A) if and
only if it it makes observational assertions (relative to A), that is, if and only if it makes
probabilistic observational assertions (relative to A) or it is falsifiable (relative to A).
As argued in §4.2, falsifiability fulfills all appropriate conditions of adequacy. I now
want to show that this new definition of probabilistic empirical significance does, too. That
it is non-trivial and thus meets condition of adequacy (A) is easily shown since sentences
without observational terms are not testable relative to ∅. And in the example with Jones’s
pregnancy, the theory that Jones uses birth control (H2) has a different likelihood given
the auxiliary assumption A that Jones is sexually active than A alone, and therefore H2
is testable relative to A. This example also shows that there are positive instances of
absolute testability. As in the case of contrastive testability, a proof that there are also
negative instances of testability would presume more precise conceptions of justification
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and dependence. That restrictions (III) and (IV) of definition 3 are not sufficient to avoid
a trivialization of testability can be shown by choosing H2  > in claim 1. In this case,
the restriction to honest sets also precludes any trivialization that restriction (IVa) could
preclude, for if an element of A depends on H, H ∈ A, so that Pr(O |H ∧ A) = Pr(O |A) for
all O.
Definitions 12 and 13 trivially fulfill condition of adequacy (B). With definition 10
as criterion of probabilistic empirical equivalence, testability meets condition (C) as well.
Since condition (C) only states that empirical equivalence to a tautology is a sufficient con-
dition for empirically non-significance, (C) is also met if the biconditional of condition (I)
in definition 12 is substituted by a conjunction, so that more theories are empirically
non-significant.
Since definitions 12 and 13 allow the use of auxiliary assumptions, they meet condition
of adequacy (D). Condition (E) is met because the theory about Jones’s use of birth control
is probabilistic and makes probabilistic observational assertions. By design, definitions 12
and 13 fulfill condition of adequacy (F).
Condition of adequacy (G) is met because of
Claim 8. If all occurring probabilities are defined, then H makes probabilistic observational
assertions if and only if observations are relevant for H.
Proof. For all observations O, Pr(O |H∧A) 6= Pr(O |A) if and only if Pr(H |O∧A) 6= Pr(H |A)
(see appendix, claim 15). Therefore there is an O such that Pr(O |H ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |A) if and
only if there is an O such that Pr(H |O ∧ A) 6= Pr(H |A).
Definition 12 fulfills condition of adequacy (H), because it generalizes classical falsifia-
bility:
Claim 9. Let H be a deductive theory, let all probability assignments be truth value-like, and
let the negation of an observation sentence again be an observation sentence. Then H makes
probabilistic observational assertions relative to A if and only if H is falsifiable relative to A.
Proof. Since interpretation 1 and interpretation 2 of the inequality in condition (II) are
equivalent, it suffices to prove the claim for interpretation 1. H does not make probabilistic
assertions relative to A if and only if for all observation sentence O, H ∧ A restricts the
probability to the same set of values as A. This is the case if and only if for every sentence,
H ∧ A restricts the probability to 1 iff A does. By claim 12 (see appendix), this holds if and
only if H ∧ A and A entail the same observation sentences, that is, if and only if H makes
no deductive observational assertions relative to A. By claim 2, this holds if and only if H
is not falsifiable relative to A.
Note that the proof also holds if the biconditional of condition (I) in definition 12 is
substituted by a conjunction, because then H makes no observational assertions if and only
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if for all O, H ∧ A restricts the probabilities to the same set of values as A, or A restricts the
probabilities more than H ∧A. But the latter is impossible since A restricts the probabilities
of an observation sentence to {0} or {1} only if H ∧ A does. If the suitable auxiliary
assumptions for falsifiability are given by honest sets, condition (H) is also fulfilled by
definition 13.
Therefore, definition 12 and arguably definition 13 fulfill all conditions of adequacy
that Sober wants a criterion of empirical significance to meet. Additionally, they also
make it possible to evaluate one theory, ID for example, independent of another one
like ET. Specifically, ET might be empirically significant without ID being so. Finally,
Sober’s use of ‘testability’ as a one-place predicate is not only meaningful, but also correct
when interpreted by the new definition: ‘Undetectable angels exist’ arguably makes no
observational assertions relative to any honest set of sentences, and ‘This coin has a
probability of .5 of landing heads each time it is tossed’ makes observational assertions, for
it assigns a probability of .5 to an observation sentence relative to ∅.
8 Conclusion
The argument against contrastive testability as a criterion of probabilistic empirical sig-
nificance can be summarized as follows: First, its restrictions on auxiliary assumptions
are in part unjustified, in part misleading, and so weak that they render the criterion
trivial. Second, even avoiding the question of suitable auxiliary assumptions, the criterion
fails to meet four criteria of adequacy that follow from Sober’s position and the intended
application of contrastive testability: It does not exclude all theories that make no ob-
servational assertions, nor all theories that are empirically equivalent to tautologies. It
is not equivalent to a Bayesian criterion of empirical significance when all probabilities
are defined, and it does not contain falsifiability as a special case. This last property is
important because a criterion of probabilistic empirical significance should contain some
adequate criterion of deductive empirical significance as a special case, and falsifiability is
the only adequate criterion.
However, Sober’s search for a criterion of probabilistic empirical significance is no
failure. For one, his defense of the assumptions underlying the search is still relevant.
Furthermore, if only unique probabilities are acceptable as likelihoods, then contrastive
testability is a plausible explication of probabilistic empirical incompatibility.
Given that contrastive testability is not an adequate criterion of empirical significance,
I have suggested to consider a theory empirically significant relative to a set of auxiliary
assumption if and only if it is not deductively or probabilistically empirically equivalent to
a tautology relative to the auxiliary assumptions. This definition fulfills all eight conditions
of adequacy. To arrive at an absolute criterion of empirical significance, I have tentatively
suggested the notion of an honest set. Its use blocks some known trivialization proofs, but
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since the definition relies on an intuitive understanding of justification, further refinements
of the absolute criterion of empirical significance will depend on an adequate explication
of justification.
A Additional proofs
Claim 10. If S  O, then
Pr
 
O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨ S) 6= 1⇔ Pr(O |H2 ∧¬H1) 6= 1 , (4)
assuming Pr
 
H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨ S) 6= 0 and Pr H2 ∧¬H1) 6= 0.
Proof. Since S  O, Pr(O ∧ S ∧Q) = Pr(S ∧Q) for any Q. Thus
Pr
 
O |H2 ∧ (¬H1 ∨ S)= Pr(O ∧H2 ∧¬H1) + Pr(O ∧H2 ∧ S)− Pr(O ∧H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ S)Pr(H2 ∧¬H1) + Pr(H2 ∧ S)− Pr(H2 ∧¬H1 ∧ S)
=
Pr(O ∧H2 ∧¬H1) + c
Pr(H2 ∧¬H1) + c
(5)
The claim follows immediately.
Claim 11. For every language L and everyM, PrM :PL → {0, 1}, PrM(Σ) = 1⇔M Σ
is a probability assignment.
Proof. Show that for all Σ,Ξ ∈ L and anyM it holds:
1. PrM(Σ)≥ 0,
2. PrM({>}) = 1, and
3. if Σ and Ξ are finite and Σ ∪Ξ ⊥, PrM({∧Σ ∨∧Ξ}) = PrM(Σ) + PrM(Ξ).
1 and 2 are immediate. 3 holds because for Σ ∪ Ξ  ⊥, M 6 Σ or M 6 Ξ, so that
PrM(
∧
Σ ∨∧Ξ) = 1 if and only if either M  Σ or M  Ξ but not both, which holds if
and only if PrM(Σ) = 1 or PrM(Ξ) = 1 but not both, that is, PrM(Σ) + PrM(Ξ) = 1
Claim 12. For any sets Σ,Ξ ⊆ L of sentences, Σ  Ξ if and only if for all M it holds: If
PrM(Σ) 6= 0 then PrM(Ξ |Σ) = 1.
Proof.
Σ  Ξ⇔∀MM Σ⇒M  Ξ
⇔∀MPrM(Σ) = 1⇒ PrM(Ξ) = 1
⇔∀M

PrM(Σ) 6= 0⇒ PrM(Ξ |Σ) = PrM(Ξ)PrM(Ξ ∪Σ) = 1

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Claim 13. If the negation of an observational sentence is observational, the following holds:
H∪A 6⊥ and there is a set Ω of observation sentences such that Ω∪A 6⊥ and Ω∪H∪A⊥
if and only if there are a set Ω of observation sentences and an observation sentence O such
that Ω ∪H ∪ A O and Ω ∪ A 6 O.
Proof. ‘⇒’: If Ω ∪ H ∪ A  ⊥, then Ω ∪ H ∪ A  O for any observation sentence O. Since
Ω ∪ A 6⊥, there is some O such that Ω ∪ A 6 O.
‘⇒’: For O and Ω with Ω∪H ∪A O and Ω∪A 6 O, Ω∪{¬O}∪A 6⊥ and Ω∪{¬O}∪
H ∪ A⊥.
Claim 14. If the negation of an observation sentence is again an observation sentence, and
H1 is deductively empirically equivalent to H2 relative to A, then, relative to A, H1 is falsifiable
if and only if H2 is falsifiable.
Proof. Assume that for all observation sentences O and sets of observation sentence Ω,
H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O if and only if H2 ∪Ω ∪ A  O. Then, for all Ω and O, H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O and
Ω ∪ A 6 O if and only if H1 ∪Ω ∪ A O and Ω ∪ A 6 O. Thus there are Ω and O such that
H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O and Ω ∪ A 6 O if and only if there are Ω and O such that H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O
and Ω ∪A 6 O. By claim 2, this means that H1 is falsifiable relative to A if and only if H2 is
falsifiable relative to A.
Claim 15. If Pr(H |A) is defined, then Pr(H |O ∧ A) = Pr(H |A) if and only if Pr(O |H ∧ A) =
Pr(O |A).
Proof. From
Pr(H |O ∧ A)
Pr(H |A) =
Pr(O |H ∧ A)
Pr(O |A) , (6)
the claim follows immediately.
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